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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
l\IAX LEON REAY, 
Defe·ndant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATE~1ENT OF THE CASE 
Case 
No. 9516 
Max Leon Reay "\Vas charged with assault with a 
deadly weapon with intent to commit robbery as Count 
One, and being an habitual criminal, on the 25th day 
of September, 1960. He was charged jointly with one 
Arthur John Witchey (R. 6). Preliminary hearing was 
had on November 21, 1960 (R. 2). The defendant was 
bound over to the Third District Court and was tried 
alone before Judge Ray VanCott, Jr. and a jury on the 
6th day of April, 1961. 
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The infonnation is set forth at R. 8-9 with the first 
count and so much of the second count as applies to 
Reay appearing at R. 8. After a jury was impaneled and 
sworn, the information filed by the District Attorney's 
office was read by the Clerk in the presence of the jury 
(R. 15). The State produced evidence and rested. De-
fendant testified; both parties rested. The jury returned 
a verdict finding the defendant guilty of assault with 
a deadly weapon with intent to commit robbery. The 
jury then received evidence on the habitual criminal 
charge (R. 67-68) and found the defendant guilty of 
being an habitual criminal. 
Defendant was comn1itted under the statutory sen-
tence for both counts and filed a timely notice of appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ronald R. Eatchel testified that on the 25th day of 
September, 1960, he was employed as the assistant man-
ager of a Safeway Store on the corner of South Temple 
and Fourth East Streets in Salt Lake City. One of his 
duties was to close the store at night (R. 23-24). Sep-
tember 25th was a Sunday and the store closed at 7 :00 
P.M. Sunday, September 25th, his wife Donna arrived 
at about 15 minutes to 7:00P.M. She had the automobile. 
He closed the store about 7:05 P.M., put the money in 
the safe, went outside, locked the door and then pad-
locked the door, using two separate locks. He had one 
key in his pocket and the key to the padlock was on the 
car key container in the possession of his wife (R. 25 ). 
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The Eatchel car was parked parallel directly in front 
of the store about twenty-five feet from the front door. 
He went to the car and opened the door for his wife and 
baby when a fellow approached and pulled a gun out of 
his pocket (R. 26). This person was identified as Arthur 
John Witchey. The witness identified the gun as a 22 
pistol. It was held by Witchey's leg and never pointed 
at hiln (R. 27). He requested them to go back to the 
door and wanted to enter the store. The witness con-
vinced him that he had only the one key (R. 28). Witchey 
escorted them back to the car. Another car was parked 
behind the Eatchel car (R. 29). Witchey got in the other 
car and it drove down Fourth East behind the witness' 
car, with the lights out. There was another person in 
the Witchey car, the witness claims, on the driver's side 
(R. 30). The Eatchel car turned west on First South 
Street and proceeded to the Police Station. The Witchey 
car continued down Fourth East. 
Eatchel reported the holdup attempt to the police 
about 7:20 P.l\L (R. 31). The witness testified he had 
never seen the defendant Reay in the vicinity of the 
Safeway Food Store (R. 32). 
Donna Eatchel testified that she was the wife of 
Ronald. On September 25, 1960, she called for her hus-
band around a quarter to seven in the evening. She 
parked the car parallel in front of the store, facing east. 
Her husband closed the store and locked two locks (R. 
3-±). She had the keys to the padlock on the ring with 
the car keys. As they were entering the car, a person 
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approached with a gun (R. 35). She identified this per-
son as Arthur John Witchey. Witchey took them to the 
door then back to the car. She saw another car which 
she later identified as a black Buick, license No. DC 4554 
Utah. \Vhen asked who was behind the wheel, she thought 
it was the fellow who had the gun (R. 37). They turned 
west on 1:!-,irst South and went to the Police Station (R. 
38). 
!fike Clark testified that he was a police officer with 
the Salt Lake Police Department, with three years' 
experience in traffic and radio patrol. He was at the 
County Hospital at 7 :00 P.M. on September 25, 1960. 
He had proceeded north on State Street when he received 
a general alarn1 920 (robbery). It was at about 17th 
South and State (R. 40). Between 13th and Ninth South 
on State Street, he received an automobile description-
1949 Buick, License No. Utah DC 4554. At Sixth South 
and State he saw the described car facing east waiting 
for a red light. He made a left turn, then a U-turn and 
pulled behind the car and verified the license number 
(R. 41). He got out and asked the occupants to get out. 
He identified the defendant Reay and Arthur John 
Witchey as the occupants. Reay was driving; Witchey 
was on the passenger's side. He found a 22-cali.bcr 
revolver under the right front seat (R. 42). The revolver 
was entered as Exhibit 1 without objection. Five ex-
pended cartridges and four live cartridges were entered 
as Exhibit 2. At the time he first sighted the car, it was 
7:21P.M. 
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Reay n1ade no statement to the officers; was told 
hy the officers not to say anything. The State rested. 
The defense put on the defendant (R. 46). He testi-
fied that he knew Witchey; had seen him on September 
25, 1960, in Salt Lake City; he lent Witchey a car 
belonging to Rex Marsh about 6:00 P.J\1. (R. 47). 
Witchey let Reay out at Walgreen's Drug Store on ~fain 
Street and said he would pick him up again in thirty to 
forty minutes. Reay never SRV{ the gun, Exhibit 1 (R. 
48). \Vhen picked up, he asked the officer why he was 
arrested. The officer did not tell him (R. 50). 
After Witchey dropped him at Walgreen's, he had 
two beers and waited for \Vitchey on Walgreen's corner. 
He is not too familiar with Salt Lake City streets (R. 
53). He believed Witchey lived on Fifth East or Second 
East. Witchey left for about forty minutes (R. 56). 
The defendant testified on cross-examination that 
he had been convicted of two felonies; that he had 
kno,vn Witchey for about two or three years. After 
\Yitchey dropped him at Walgreen's he went north up 
1Iain Street. The car belonged to Rex Marsh and he 
had been living with Rex Marsh and using the car for 
several days. Defense rested. 
The jury was instructed by the court. No instruc-
tions were requested nor exceptions taken by either side 
(R. 56). The jury returned a verdict of guilty of the 
crime of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to 
comnlit robbery, as charged in the information (R. 84). 
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Court reconvened and instructed as follows: 
"Mr. Liston, will you read the information 
with reference to the second counrt (sic) and 
the plea the defendant has entered thereto~" (R. 
67). 
The State offered and the court received over objec-
tions, Exhibits 3 and 4. Exhibit 3, an exemplified copy 
of a commitment of one Max Leon Reay from Idaho, and 
Exhibit 4, certified copy of a commitment from the 
Clerk of the District Court for Salt Lake County. 
The State rested without testimony or other proof 
connecting the defendant with the Exhibits 3 or 4 (R. 
67-68). The jury was instructed on count two charging 
defendant with being an habitual criminal (R. 68-69-70), 
retired and returned with a verdict of guilty of being 
an habitual criminal. 
STATE~1ENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
VERDICT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 4. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HAVING THE ENTIRE INFOR-
MATION READ TO THE JURY UPON BEGINNING THE 
TRIAL OF THE ASSAULT CASE. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBITS 3 AND 
4 WITH NO FOUNDATION WHATSOEVER TO CONNECT 
THE EXHIBITS WITH THE DEFENDANT. 
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THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
VERDICT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A careful review of the evidence and that portion 
of the case concerning the assault with a deadly weapon 
with intent to commit robbery does not disclose a scintilla 
of evidence connecting the defendant Reay with the 
cri1ne. Ronald Eatchel, one of the State's witnesses, 
stated that another person was in the Witchey automobile 
in front of the Safeway Store on South Temple, but did 
not identify that person even as to sex (R. 30). On cross-
examination, he unequivocally stated that he did not 
see Reay on September 25th at 7:00 P.M. (R. 31). He 
(Eatchel) further states that the only place he ever saw 
Reay was at the city jail (R. 31). Mrs. Eatchel stated 
that there was another fellow sitting in the car, but 
didn't purport to identify him as being the defendant 
Reay (R. 37). 
Officer Clark identified the defendant as being in 
the Buick car earlier identified by Mrs. Eatchel, at a 
later time when the car, facing east on Sixth South 
Street at that street's intersection with State Street, 
·was waiting for a red light (R. 41). Reay was driving. 
The police car made a left turn in front of the Buick 
and then aU-turn on Sixth South Street and pulled up · 
behind the Buick. Reay made no attempt to flee (R. 41). 
Reay made no admissions to the officers that might con-
nect him with the crin1e charged; in fact, he was told by 
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the officers not to talk. There is no other evidence con-
necting Reay with the crime, and no evidence putting 
him closer than ten blocks to the scene of the attempted 
holdup. There is no evidence connecting him with the 
weapon found in the car and no evidence even inferring 
a knowledge of what Witchey's intentions or plans had 
been. 
The sole circumstance causing the arrest and the 
charging of the defendant Reay was his presence in an 
automobile with Witchey twenty to forty minutes after 
the attempted holdup and more than ten city blocks from 
the place of the attempted holdup, headed in a direction 
which would take the car closer to the scene of the crime 
rather than in apparent flight. Witchey did not testify. 
In State v. Marasco, 81 Utah 325, 17 P. 2d 919, the 
court considered and reversed a case directly in point 
with this case. In the Marasco case there were further 
facts to back up the one circumstance. In that case the 
defendant was charged with arson of a store owned 
by him in Helper, Utah. After the explosion that started 
the fire, a man was seen running away from the build-
ing by two witnesses, neither of whom could identify. 
The explosion was between 2 :30 A.M. and 3 :00 A.M. 
At 3 :30 A.M. the defendant, together with Turzo, was 
seen in Castlegate, Utah, approximately four miles from 
the scene of the explosion and fire. He there hired a 
man, who was later a witness in the case, to take him 
to Salt Lake City. Defendant asked this man "to say 
nothing about taking him in" and later ''to say nothing 
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in court" and "say it wasn't him." Turzo was connected 
with an autmnobile that was found burned and contained 
kegs containing gasoline at the scene of the explosion 
and fire. The defendant ~1arasco had a defense of alibi 
and on the stand denied being in Carbon County on that 
date. The court, in reversing the Marasco conviction, 
states at page 922-923: 
"That son1e of such testimony shows suspi-
cious circumstances may well be conceded. Per-
haps the most probative is the testimony that 
the defendant at Castlegate, about 4 miles from 
the scene of the crilne, about thirty or forty 
minutes after the building was demolished and 
on fire, hired a man to drive hi1n to Salt Lake 
City and ad1nonished the driver to say nothing 
about it, frmn which some elements in the nature 
of a flight might be inferred. The corpus delicti 
being proven, the fact that an accused fled from 
the vicinity where a crime was committed, and 
having knowledge that he was likely to be arrested 
for the crime or charged vvith its commission, or 
suspected of guilt in connection therewith, may be 
shown as a circumstance of guilt, and may be 
considered in connection with other evidence or 
circumstances tending to connect the accused with 
the commission of the offense. But it is only a 
circumstance. It alone will not justify conviction 
of the defendant, in the absence of other evidence 
tending to connect him with the commission of the 
crilne. 8 R.C.L. 192. A leading and well-con-
sidered case on the subject to that effect is State 
v. Poe, 123 Iowa, 118, 98 N.W. 587, 101 Am. St. 
Rep. 307. To that effect also are People v. Wong 
Ah N gow, 54 Cal. 151, 35 Am. Rep. 69; Smith v. 
State, 106 Ga. 673, 32 S.E. 851, 71 Am. St. Rep. 
286.'' 
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Reay, in the instant cas8, took the stand for the 
purpose of explaining his presence in the car with 
Witchey at the time of arrest. It 1s apparent that the 
jury chose not to believe him. Whether their disbelief 
arose from the evidence of his prior convictions or his 
demeanor on the stand is immaterial. Again citing from 
the l\:'farasco case, at page 923: 
"There is the further circumstance, the state-
ment of the defendant to the city marshal that 
at the tiine of the commission of the offense he 
was in Salt Lake City and disputed by the testi-
mony of the witness that just after the fire the 
defendant was at Castlegate and the testimony 
of another witness that at 8 o'clock on the mor-
ning of the fire he was seen at Provo, about 73 
miles from Helper, and about 45 miles from Salt 
Lake City; a claimed alibi being a shield or wea-
pon of defense, which, if disbelieved or discredited, 
may not be turned by the state into an offensive 
weapon or as affirmative proof connecting the 
accused with the commission of the offense. There 
being no direct evidence connecting the defendant 
with the commission of the offense-no such evi-
dence is claimed by the state-and considering 
all of the suspicious or shown circun1stances to-
gether, we are of the opinion that the evidence 
is insufficient to connect the defendant with the 
commission of the offense and to let the case go 
to the jury." 
The only item of evidence connecting Reay with the 
offense charged is his presence in an automobile which 
had been identified as being at the scene of the holdup, 
but at a different place and at a different time. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
"Whenever circumstantial evidence is relied 
on to prove a fact, the circumstances must be 
proved and cannot be presumed, and the cir-
ctunstances proved must be consistent with the 
n1ain fact sought to be presumed. They must be 
not only consistent with the theory which is sought 
to be established, but absolutely inconsistent with 
any other rational theory." 20 Am. J ur., Evi-
dence, Weight and Sufficiency, Sec. 1190, citing 
Carter v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 65 
Utah 465, 238 P. 259, 41 A.L.R. 1495, among other 
cases. 
The court instructed the jury in compliance with 
this citation (Instruction No. 5, R. 74), but it is 
apparent from the entire record that the jury did not 
follow said instruction. 
While it is unfortunate that neither a motion to 
dismiss was made at the end of the State's case, nor a 
motion for directed verdict upon both sides resting, the 
crime charged carries a sentence of five years to life, 
76-51-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953. It is also the third 
conviction charged in an habitual criminal count under 
76-1-18, Utah Code Annotated 1953, carrying a minimum 
fifteen-year sentence. An appellate court cannot in good 
conscience refuse to consider the utter lack of evidence 
due to failure of counsel at the trial level to make proper 
motions, or the failure of the trial court to invite such 
motions. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 4. 
In Instruction No. 4, the court instructed the jury 
as follows: 
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"You are instructed that all persons con-
cerned in the commission of a crime, whether they 
directly commit the act constituting the offense, 
or aid or abet in its commission, are principals 
in any crime so committed, and where two or 
more persons with a common intent engage jointly 
in the commission of an unlawful act, each is 
responsible for the act or acts of the other done 
in the furtherance of their common design." (R. 
75). 
Neither the evidence nor the pleadings called for 
such an instruction and it was prejudicial to the defense. 
While we agree that under the laws of Utah one who 
aids or abets is a principal, the information (R. 8) does 
not charge Reay with aiding or abetting Arthur J. 
Witchey in assaulting Ronald and Donna Eatchel, but 
jointly charges him with the assault itself. The evidence 
as discussed in the preceding point gives no inference 
that Reay loaned the car to Witchey for the purpose of 
committing a crime or with the knowledge that he 
(Witchey) contemplated the commission of a crime. 
There is no evidence of Reay's advising or encouraging 
the commission of a crime. The evidence does not put 
Reay at the scene of the crime. The mere fact that he 
was driving the aut01nobile at a later time, even com-
bined with evidence of the knowledge of the commission 
of a crime or flight (neither of which is shown by the 
evidence), could only justify a charge of being an acces-
sory after the fact and would not support or justify 
Instruction No. 4, supra. 
The .:Marasco case, supra, citing State v. Baum, 47 
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Utah 7, 151 P. 518-19, with regard' to a similar instruc-
tion, says: 
"There was no evidence to show and no one 
claimed that the defendant but aided and abetted 
in the cmnmission of the offense, advised' or en-
couraged its commission. There, hence, was no 
occasion to give that kind of a charge. Under 
the circumstances we think it was Inisleading and 
harmful. 
"The Baum case in such particular was ap-
proved and followed in the case of State v. Sid-
doway, 61 Utah 189, 211 P. 968. To the· same 
effect were further cases cited in 17 P. 2d at 924. 
It is familiar doctrine that it is erroneous to give 
instructions based on a state of facts of which 
there is no evidence tending to prove, though 
such instructions abstractly contain correct state-
ments of the law. We, here, think as was stated 
in State v. Baum, that the giving of the instruction 
as modified was erroneous and prejudicial.'' 
It is again admitted that the record shows no excep-
tion to have been taken to this or any other instruction 
by either party. However, it is the policy, in fact, the 
very essence of our appellate system, that a person 
should not be allowed to be convicted of crimes carrying 
penalties of the magnitude here involved' due to failure 
of counsel or the trial court to take advantage of pro-
cedural steps contemplated by our trial system. 
The court instructs on "aid and abet'' and totally 
fails to define those terms. The jury could have well 
believed that the mere presence in the automobile at a 
time following the crime could constitute aiding and 
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abetting, or either of them, even in the absolute absence 
of evidence showing Reay's "knowledge" or "intent", as 
is displayed by the record. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HAVING THE ENTIRE INFOR-
MATION READ TO THE JURY UPON BEGINNING THE 
TRIAL OF THE ASSAULT CASE. 
After the jury was impaneled and sworn, quoting 
R. 15, "The clerk read the information filed by the Dis-
trict Attorney in said case." The information (R. 8-9) 
contains two counts, the second being the charge of being 
an habitual criminal under 76-1-18, and alleging and 
identifying two previous felony convictions. The record 
does not indicate the reading of only count 1 or a dele-
tion of the words "and of being a habitual criminal in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 1, Section 18, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953" as set out in the heading of the infor-
mation (R. 8). 76-1-20, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
setting forth the procedure in charging and trying a 
person charged with being an habitual criminal, states 
in part: 
"The jury shall not (emphasis ours) be told 
of the previous convictions of felony and' the trial 
on the felony committed in the State of Utah shall 
proceed as in other cases." 
State v. Stewart, 110 lTtah 203, 171 P. 2d 383, 386, 
following and approving this procedure as outlined in 
State v. Ferrone, 96 Conn. 160, 113 A. 452, 457, and in 
State v. RB~lly, 94 Conn. 698, 110 A. 550, states at page 
387: 
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• • •* * * The information should be divided 
into two parts. In the first the particular offense 
with which the accused is charged should be set 
forth, and this should be upon the first page of 
the information and signed by the prosecuting 
officer. In the second part former convictions 
should be alleged, and this should be upon the 
second page of the information, separable from 
the first page and signed by the prosecuting offi-
cer. The entire information should be read to 
the accused and his plea taken in the absence of 
the jurors. When the jury has been impaneled 
and sworn, the clerk should read to them only 
that part of the information which sets forth the 
crime for which the accused is to be tried. The 
trial should then proceed in every respect as if 
there were no allegations of former convictions, 
of which no mention should be made in the evi-
dence, or in the remarks of counsel, or in the 
charge of the court. When the jury retire to 
consider their verdict, only the first page of the 
information, on which the crime charged is set 
out, should be given to them. If they return a 
verdict of guilty, the second part of the infor-
mation, in which former convictions are alleged, 
should be read to them without reswearing them, 
and they should be charged to inquire on that 
issue. Of course, the accused may plead guilty 
to this part of the information, and then no fur-
ther proceedings before or by the jury would 
be necessary. No reason appears why the accused, 
if he should' choose, might not submit this issue 
to the court without the jury. 
" 'In this way the well-recognized rights of 
an accused person will be protected, and the 
principles of justice and our long-established laws 
which have been designed to secure an impartial 
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trial in every criminal cause will be recognized, 
respected, and obeyed.' 
"The court also pointed out that until a 
verdict has been rendered on the principal issue, 
there is no occasion to mention the prior con-
victions since previous offenses would not be 
competent to prove that defendant committed the 
offense for which he is then on trial. Likewise, 
the court remarked that by directing attention to 
prior offenses, a defendant may be deprived of 
the presumption of innocence, and in doubtful 
cases a verdict of guilty n1ight be based on prior 
convictions instead of on the basis of proof of 
the particular crime for which defendant is on 
trial.'' 
With regard to the above, also see State v. Russum, 
107 Utah 94, 152 P. 2d 88, following State v. Ferguson, 
83 Utah 375, 28 P. 2d 175. 
It appears from the record by which this court is 
bound that the information filed by the District Attorney 
was read to the jury prior to the trial of the assault with 
intent to commit robbery case. The infonnation itself 
(R. 8) shows both counts to he on the same page. Neither 
the information on its face nor the record of the trans-
cript of the testimony at R. 15 indicates a deletion of 
either the words "and being a habitual criminal in vio-
lation of 78 (with a "6" above the "8" sic), Chapter 1, 
Section 18, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as follows, to 
wit:", or a deletion of count 2 of the first page of the 
information, although there are certain ink marks on 
count 2 that would indicate only that part of the charge 
regarding Max Leon Reay was read. Under the situation 
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as shown by the record, the jury was informed of alleged 
prior convictions, and though no attempt was made by 
the State to prove said convictions in the first phase of 
the case, such reading of the information prejudices the 
defendant and his counsel in their choice as to whether 
the defendant should testify or take advantage of his 
statutory right to silence. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBITS 3 AND 
4 WITH NO FOUNDATION WHATSOEVER TO CONNECT 
THE EXHIBITS WITH THE DEFENDANT. 
The State offered no proof to show that the person 
or persons named in Exhibits 3 and 4 were the same 
person as the defendant. The defendant objected to 
admission of the documents on the ground that they 
were not the best evidence, and said objections were 
overruled by the court. 
State v. Br'Uno, 69 Utah 444, 256 P. 2d 109, at page 
110 citing 16 C.J. 1342, says: 
"In all crirninal prosecutions when the State 
desires to inflict a more severe penalty on account 
of the defendant having been convicted previously, 
the burden is on the State to prove all facts nec-
essary to bring the case within the statute auth-
orizing such penalty to be imposed. Thus, like 
any other material element, the State must prove 
prior conviction of the accused and must estab-
lish his identity as the person previously con-
victed. (Citing cases and texts)." 
And at page 111: 
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"If it were held that because a person has 
the same name as a person who has theretofore 
been convicted of a similar offense, it follows as 
a matter of law that such person is the same 
person as was named in the prior proceeding, 
such holding would be contrary to our fundamen-
tal principles and proceedings in criminal actions. 
It would be a denial of right to trial and deter-
mination by jury, one of the essential facts always 
necessary to be found in order to convict an 
accused of the graver offense." 
The writer is aware of the case of State v . .Aime, 
62 Utah 476, 220 P. 704 (1923), which is distinguished 
from the Bruno case, supra, on the basis of additional 
evidence besides the identity of names. 11 A.L.R. 2d 870, 
et seq. contains an exhaustive annotation on the question, 
listing the Aime case, supra, as holding identity of names 
to be sufficient, and the Bruno case (a later case) hold-
ing identity to be insufficient. Many of the cases go off 
on a basis of the cmnmon or peculiar nature of the name. 
However, in the case at hand, there is no evidence of the 
prevalence of the name "Reay'' either here or at the 
location of the Idaho conviction. 
Under the procedure set up 1n the Stewart case, 
supra, the habitual criminal count is, or at least it should 
be, tried as a distinct connt, and the fact that the defen-
dant testified as to two felony convictions should be 
neither an affirmance or a denial of Exhibits 3 and 4 
where the defendant did not choose to testify in the 
latter phase of the case. 
The status of being an habitual criminal carries a 
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greater statutory penalty than any crime 1n our code 
with the exception of the two top homicide counts. Evi-
dence of prior commitments of a person of the same 
name should not be allowed to go to a jury without sub-
stantial foundation to identify the copy of the commit-
ments with the person of the accused, or (as the Bruno 
case sets forth) it will not meet the fundamental prin-
ciples and proceedings of our criminal actions and vio-
lates the intent of the lJtah Constitution, Article 1, Sec-
tion 12, and 77-1-8(6) and 77-31-4, ·utah Code Annotated 
1953. 
SUMMARY 
It is the belief of the writer that a scrutiny of the 
transcript of the trial is in itself enough to compel a 
reversal of the conviction of assault with a deadly wea-
pon with intent to commit robbery, and it is elemental 
that in the absence of that conviction the finding of 
Reay's status as an habitual criminal cannot stand under 
the provisions of 76-1-18, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
It is interesting to note that, though Witchey had 
pleaded guilty and been sentenced on the identical crime, 
thus depriving him of his right to refuse to testify by 
his constitutional right against self-incrimination, U.S. 
Constitution, Fifth Amendment, and though he was in 
court under the State's subpoena (R. 14 and R. 48), the 
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State did not see fit to use him as a witness. While he 
was also accessible to the defense and the reason for his 
silence remains undisclosed, the State is charged with 
the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which 
burden the record does not sustain. 
It is respectfully submitted that the assault with 
intent to commit robbery charge should be dismissed, 
carrying with it the key conviction necessary to sustain 
the count ·of being an habitual criminal, or in the alter-
native, that the habitual criminal charge be reversed due 
to the procedural violations to the intent of 76-1-18 
and 19 and the failure of the State to identify the defen-
dant ·with Exhibits 3 and 4. 
With respect to the habitual criminal count, the 
record indicates that the State and the court did not 
follow the procedure recommended by State v. Stewart, 
supra, and cases cited therein and, further, that there 
was absolutely no proof of identity of the defendant with 
Exhibits 3 and 4. 
Upon the above reasoning and errors of the court, 
defendant contends, first, that the initial charge of assault 
with a deadly weapon with intent to commit robbery 
should be dismissed for entire lack of evidence to con-
nect the defendant with the crime and for prejudice aris-
ing from erroneous Instruction No. 4 and prejudice 
arising from the reading of the information to the jury 
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containing the habitual criminal count, indicating two 
previous felony violations before the evidence com-
menced, or in the alternative, to dismiss the habitual 
criininal count due to prejudice and procedural viola-
tions as set forth in Point Nos. 3 and 4, and an entire 
failure of the State to identify the defendant with Ex-
hibits 3 and' 4 other than as to name. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SUMNER J. HATCH 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant 
409 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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